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THE DISCRIMINATION AND DENIAL OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FOR THE PEOPLE OF SINDH 
 
Kavita Tekchandani1 
I. The Creation of Pakistan 
 Pakistan was created out of the Indian partition of 1947, following 
two centuries of British colonial rule. Its creation was the consequence of 
an inability to accommodate minority interests within independent India.2 
The Muslim minority within India feared they would become second-class 
citizens in a Hindu-majority state. The Muslim League, therefore, pushed 
to form an independent Muslim state.  The partition, the arbitrary drawing 
of borders, resulted in eight million people, mainly Muslims migrating 
from India to Pakistan and millions of Sikhs and Hindus migrating from 
Pakistan to India making it the largest inter-state migration in history and, 
in the process, creating millions of refugees.3 
 Prior to Indian Independence, and on the basis of their shared faith, 
the Muslim population, who would later create Pakistan, felt that they 
were a unified community, despite their many ethnic and linguistic 
differences. They conceived themselves as intrinsically different from the 
other religious and cultural groups on the Indian sub-continent.4 However, 
following the creation of Pakistan, the Muslim population no longer feared 
being discriminated against by a Hindu majority state that in turn, failed to 
                                                 
1 Kavita Tekchandani is a recent graduate of UC Hastings School of Law where she 
focused on international law.  Ms. Tekchandani is currently interning at the India Centre 
for Human Rights and the Law in Mumbai. She wrote this paper to help bring to the 
attention of the international community the denial of cultural and human rights and 
environmental atrocities being faced by Sindhis in Pakistan, with the hope that a peaceful 
and lasting solution to the conflict is soon reached. 
2 JAVAID REHMAN, THE WEAKNESSES IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF MINORITY 
RIGHTS 5 (Kluwer Law Int. 2000). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 133. 
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unify the Muslim population. Though Pakistan was a state created on 
religious lines, a significant number of religious, ethnic and linguistic 
minorities were part of the composition of the country.5  
 In the creation of Pakistan, various regional minorities charged that 
they had been discriminated against and forced to assimilate into the 
central government’s notion of what constituted the national Pakistani 
identity.6 Within Pakistan there exists five major regional provinces; 
Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan, Azad Kashmir and the North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP).  
II. Sindh: A Nation of its Own 
 Sindh is Pakistan’s second largest province with approximately 
24% of the nation’s population.7 Sindhi is a term used to describe the 
indigenous people of Sindh, the southeast province of Pakistan. Sindhis 
have one of the oldest cultures and civilizations in the world. The 
Mohenjo-Daro civilization, dating back approximately 5,000 years, was 
one of the first civilizations of the world and was formed along the banks 
of the Indus River running through the heart of what is now known as the 
Sindh province. This region has historically enjoyed a great deal of 
autonomy, allowing for the development of its own culture. Sindhis have 
historically been known to promote a culture of non-violence, secularism 
and democracy. 
 During the time of the partition, there was an effort to drive out the 
Sindhi Hindus into India. The property left behind by the Hindus was 
arbitrarily distributed to political supporters of the then ruling government 
                                                 
5 Id. 
6 Id. Pakistan actively campaigned to bring assimilation and conformity to the population, 
in an effort to build nationalism. See Id at 141.   
7 Amnesty International Special Report: Pakistan, Arrests of Political Opponents in Sindh 
Province, August  1990- early 1992, 3 (1992), available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/pakistan/document.do?id=3A9E2BD6FD58394D8
02569A600601F5B. 
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and Muslim refugees coming from the newly independent India, by the 
National Government. The influx of the Muslim refugees coming from 
India, known as the Muhajirs, resulted in Sindhis becoming a minority in 
their own land.8 The sudden Muhajir influx and the national government’s 
policy of cultural assimilation has been the root causes in bringing the 
Sindhi culture and language to the brink of extinction. The case of the 
Sindhis reflects the reality that international and national laws against 
discrimination and genocide offer ineffective protections for minorities, 
unless governments take steps to also protect these minorities from mass 
deportation and imposition of an alien population onto their land.9  
III. Sindhis: Constituting an Ethnic and Linguistic Minority 
 “Pakistan is not a monolithic, homogeneous entity but a homeland 
of five historic nations.”10 In the first years following independence, 
Pakistan demonstrated a strong commitment to adopt principles of 
equality and non-discrimination for all individuals. Pakistan ratified 
various international covenants and instruments affirming its commitment 
to protect minorities. These commitments include: the United Nations 
Charter, the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the United Nations 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (implemented through the Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination (CERD).11 Pakistan’s Constitutions of 1956, 
                                                 
8 REHMAN, supra note 1, at 87. 
9 Id. 
10 The Sindh Perchar, Official Newsletter of the World Sindhi Congress, Delegates at the 
International Conference on Sindh (Sep. 30, 2003), available at 
http://www.sindhlink.net/wsc/2003/Press_Release_AGM2003.doc. 
11 REHMAN, supra note 1, at 135. See also NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND 
DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991).  
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1963 and 1973 have all affirmed fundamental rights based on equality and 
non-discrimination.12  
 However, despite such international and constitutional 
commitments, the Government of Pakistan has not actually put these 
obligations into practice. The official stance of the Government is that no 
ethnic, racial and linguistic minorities exist within Pakistan.13 The only 
minorities recognized by the Government are religious minorities.14 
 The Pakistani- Islamabad based government realizes that giving an 
official recognition to such minorities would give these minorities a basis 
on which to claim protection under the international legal instruments 
Pakistan signed in its formative years.15 The result is that linguistic and 
ethnic minorities like the Sindhis, Baluchis, Muhajirs and Pakhtuns are not 
given any official minority status and, therefore, no protections.16  
 This same policy of refusing to recognize ethnic and linguistic 
minorities was a driving force behind the secession movement of the East 
Pakistanis to form an independent Bangladesh in 1971.17 It has been 
argued that if Pakistan accorded more linguistic and cultural autonomy to 
East Pakistan, the people would not have demanded an independent state 
and would have rather been able to express their self-determination within 
the structures and confines of the Pakistani nation-state.18 
 State reports submitted to CERD, which is the implementing 
mechanism of the Convention of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 
deny that Pakistan has any ethnic or linguistic minorities.19 During the 4th 
                                                 
12 REHMAN, supra note 1, at 135.  
13 Id. at 136. See also The Sindh Perchar, supra note 10, at 2. 
14 REHMAN, supra note 1, at 136. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 136. 
17 Id. at 219 
18 Id. at 219 [Argument by Author, Javaid Rehman]. 
19 Id. 
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Periodic Report to the Committee, the Pakistan representative explained 
that they did not provide the Committee with information of its people 
based on race, descent or ethnic origin, because their government did not 
keep data on such characteristics of its people because “[i]n Pakistan there 
[are] no racial or ethnic minorities, but only religious minorities…”20 In 
the 5th Report, despite criticisms from the Committee, there  were further 
denials of the existence of such minorities. The Pakistani representative 
stated: 
The people of Pakistan being of a relatively homogenic 
racial group and following the precepts of Islam, which is a 
universal religion advocating tolerance for people 
belonging to every race, have not faced the problem of 
discrimination. It has therefore not been necessary to enact 
any new laws… to deal specifically with racial 
discrimination other than already existing in the country.21 
 
 Committee members rightly expressed their concerns that if all 
state parties to the Convention were to adopt the same criteria to decide if 
it was necessary to adopt new measures to protect their racial minorities 
against discrimination, then all signatories would all be exempt from their 
obligations under the Convention.22  The Committee has also expressed 
concern that Pakistan’s policy in refusing to recognize its minorities has 
resulted in not giving them any specific protection under the Convention 
that would otherwise derive from their official recognition.23 
 During the 15th International Conference of the World Sindhi 
Congress, held in London, political scholar Dr. Walt Landry emphasized 
                                                 
20 REHMAN, supra note 1, at 137 (quoting 4th Periodic Report of Pakistan before the 
Committee, CERD/C/SR.322 para. 3). 
21 Id. at 138. (quoting the 5th Periodic Report of Pakistan before the Committee, 
CERD/C/20/Add.15, para.1). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. See Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Observations and 
Comments CERD/C/304/Add.25 para.12, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CERD.C.304.Add.25.En?Opendocument. 
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that Pakistan, like the European federations, could not last or prosper 
without giving recognition to the separate identities of the ethno lingual 
groups within their borders.24 Pakistan’s policy in refusing to recognize 
the existence of these differences was compared to the policy taken by the 
former Yugoslavia, which resulted in polarity, violence and frustration 
among the cultural groups.25  
IV. Sindh and the Muhajirs 
 Muhajirs is a term used to describe the Muslim population that 
migrated from India to Pakistan and who came to settle in the Sindh 
province. Following partition in 1947, millions of Sindhi Hindus and 
Sikhs were forced to leave Sindh for India. They were replaced by 
millions of Muhajirs, who came to dominate the local and national 
political arena for many years. 26 Seats in the Sindh Provincial Assembly 
were provided for the new arriving Muhajirs.27 
 In fact, the Muhajirs also began to dominate the civil service, 
military positions and places of higher education. The Sindhis were 
predominantly an agricultural society. The Muhajirs however, were 
coming mainly from the cities and towns of India, representing a largely 
urbanized, entrepreneurial and educated class. 28 There were constant 
Muhajir-led federal interventions into the local government affairs of the 
regional provinces. 29 The language, culture and politics brought by the 
new refugees that began to dominate Pakistani society, was very different 
than what Sindhis were used to. 30  
                                                 
24 The Sindh Perchar, supra note 9. 
25 Id. 
26 REHMAN, supra note 1, at 215. (For example, from 1947-1952 the majority of 
Pakistan’s main political positions were held by Muhajirs). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 216. 
29 Id. at 215. 
30 REHMAN, supra note 1, at 215. 
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 Sindhis soon became only a bare majority in the seven main cities 
of the province. The impact of being inundated by the Muhajirs was 
enormous. First, Karachi, the biggest city and main port of Sindh, was 
detached from the state and made into a “federal district.”31 Sindhi 
language was then abolished within the Karachi federal offices and banned 
from being used in Karachi university examinations, and the language 
department of the University of Karachi was shut down.32 Urdu was then 
made the national language, despite the fact that less than 8% of the 
population of the entire country spoke the language. 33 This brought on a 
deep division between the native Sindhis and the Muhajirs.  
 The first elected Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1973-1977), 
a native Sindhi, pushed for alleviating some Sindhi grievances of 
discrimination.34 He introduced a lateral entry program for Sindhis to join 
the civil service. Sindhis were allotted a quota of 11.4% of the seats in the 
federal bureaucracy.35 Furthermore, more Sindhis were appointed to 
national and provincial government offices. The Muhajirs, however, 
interpreted these actions as going against Muhajir interests. The Muhajirs 
then had basis to make claims of discrimination, persecution and political 
repression. In fact, many Muhajir groups participated in the military coup 
led by General Zia-ul-Haq to replace Bhutto.36  
 Today, Sindhis and the Muhajirs share some of the same concerns, 
as they both face discrimination from the central government. They want 
to ban the influx of more outsiders, such as those from the Punjab 
province, and allowing properties within Sindh to be sold to the new 
arrivals. They also demand greater provincial freedoms, and less 
                                                 
31 Id. at 216. 
32 Id.  
33 Id. at 141. 
34 Id. at 217. 
35 Id. 
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interference from the central government.37 They are also united against 
the building of the Kalabagh Dam and Greater Thal Canal on the River 
Indus, which would result in great environmental and human costs in the 
province.   
V.  Specific Repression of Political Opponents in the Sindh Province 
 
1. Overview 
 For years, Sindhi political and human rights organizations reported 
discrimination and political repression by the national government against 
Sindhis who were calling for increased political, cultural and linguistic 
autonomy. The 1992 Amnesty International Reports confirmed mass 
political imprisonment of political opposition members in the Sindh 
province from the 1990-1992 period.38  
 The dismissal of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in August 1990, 
resulted in hundreds of opposition political party members being arrested, 
most of them associated with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and other 
Sindhi nationalist parties.39 The PPP is a national party, but has its largest 
membership and organizational base in the Sindh.40 Amnesty International 
has evidence that a large number of prisoners were political prisoners, 
many who are “prisoners of conscious,” detained for the peaceful exercise 
of rights such as freedom of association and freedom of expression.41 
2. Political Developments in Sindh 
 In August 1990 the President of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, 
dismissed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, daughter of former Prime 
                                                                                                                         
36 REHMAN, supra note 1, at 217. 
37 Id. at 218. 
38 Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 2. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 3. 
41 Id. 
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Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, under the PPP government.42 Khan went on 
to dismiss all the national and provincial assemblies, calling a State of 
Emergency.  Benazir Bhutto maintained that her dismissal was an 
“unconstitutional coup” and illegal.43 However, a Lahore High Court 
confirmed the dismissal as legal and constitutional, because, among other 
things, the PPP government failed to pass substantive legislation and to 
maintain law and order in Sindh.44 Prime Minister Bhutto was charged 
with favoritism and corruption.45  
 However, International observers, including the UK Parliamentary 
Human Rights Group concluded that that the hearings against Benazir 
Bhutto were “misconceived and partisan” and were brought by the PPP’s 
principle opponent for political reasons.46 The Human Rights Commission 
of Pakistan observed that the “special tribunals against members of the 
outgoing government were noisily launched during the run-up to elections 
and the charges were repeatedly cited… to run down the party in the eyes 
of the voter.”47 
 The State of Emergency was lifted when Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif, backed by the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA), took office.  
The IDA also won the general elections.48 The provincial government of 
Sindh consisted of a coalition of the PPP and Muhajir Quami Movement 
                                                 
42 Id. at 5. 
43 Id. at 6. 
44 Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 6. 
45 Id. at 7. The Fordham Institute for Ethics and Economic Policy (FIEEP) at Fordham 
University, Corruption Information Exchange Report on Pakistan, available at 
http://www.fordham.edu/economics/vinod/cie/pakistan.htm. However, in July 2003, both 
Zardari and Benazir Bhutto were convicted of money laundering by a Geneva magistrate, 
which allegedly took place during her 1993 to 1996 term as prime minister. They refused 
to comply with the magistrate’s order to return US $11million to the Pakistan 
government. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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party (MQM), who took power in 1988.49 Following the dismissal of this 
provincial government, a caretaker government under Jam Sadiq Ali was 
installed in August 1990.50 Elections were not held until October 27, 1990, 
where the IDA, and an alliance of nine right wing and Islamic parties, 
together with the MQM formed the government.51  
 During this time there was also political unrest due to an ethnic 
conflict between the Urdu speaking Muhajirs (MQM) and the indigenous 
Sindhis.52 The Sindhi nationalist parties including, Jeay Sindh Mahaz (led 
by GM Syed), Jeay Sindh Progressive Party, the Sindhi National Front and 
the Sindhi Awami Tehrik, expressed a fear that the Sindhis would be 
outnumbered and dominated by the Muhajirs.53 Ethnic strife was high 
during PM Bhutto’s term in office. The MQM transferred its alliance from 
the PPP to the IDA, when they felt they did not receive enough support 
from PM Benazir Bhutto and the PPP.54 In 1990, the political strife 
between the MQM and PPP hit a peak when the MQM organized a 
general strike and hunger strike in January.55 In May of that year, security 
forces raided a Muhajir community that resulted in massive rioting.  
Several thousands were arrested and about one hundred people were 
killed.56  
 Although the ethnic conflict decreased following the IDA 
assumption of office in 1990, there was still a very high number of 
political and criminal violence in the area.57 For example, in the first ten 
                                                 
49 Id. 
50 Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 7. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 3. 
53 Id.  
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 3. 
57 Id. at 7. 
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weeks of 1991, 738 kidnappings and 320 murders were reported.58 The 
provincial government has held the PPP and allies to be responsible for 
these politically motivated crimes, but the PPP denied these charges.59  
 Both the IDA led provincial government and the federal 
government led by Prime Minister Sharif led a policy of intimidation of 
the major opposition parties: the PPP and Sindhi Nationalist parties.60The 
Sindh Chief Minister, Jam Sadiq Ali, in an effort to crush the PPP, tried to 
portray the PPP as a terrorist organization.61 To do this, the provincial 
government made public statements to identify the PPP with a notorious 
terrorist organization, the Al-Zulfikar Organization (AZO).62 Chief 
Minister Sadiq declared to the press in November 1991 that, “the PPP and 
AZO are two names for one party.”63 The AZO was responsible for a 
number of terrorist attacks within Pakistan in the early 1980’s, and is 
believed to be founded by PM Benazir Bhutto’s brothers, Murtaza and 
Shanawaz.64 Among other things, the AZO has been accused of making 
various assassination attempts on General Zia ul-Haq’s life and hijacking a 
Pakistani airplane en route to Kabul.65 The PPP, however, has consistently 
denied any involvement with AZO activities.66 In fact, after years of 
hiding in Syria, when Murtaza returned to Pakistan in 1988, he entered as 
a political rival against his sister Benazir and formed a political faction of 
PPP- known as Shaheed Bhutto.67  
                                                 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 4. 
61 Id. 
62 Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 4. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 5. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Syed Saleem Shazad, Saudi, Morocco Blasts may Fuel Kashmir Terror, South Asia 
Monitor, available at http://www.southasiamonitor .org/focus/2003/may/23foc01.html 
(last visited May 20,  2004). 
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3. Patterns of Political Detention in Sindh 
 In an effort to crush the Sindh Nationalist Parties and the PPP, the 
IDA backed government has used two main methods of political 
intimidation. First, they have arrested opposition leaders using successive 
detention orders, and arrests based on pretentious criminal charges, and 
secondly, they have used mass arrests for the opposition supporters.68  
 Former members of the National Assembly (MNAs) and Members 
of the Provincial Assembly (MPA’s), as well as other PPP leaders have 
been arrested on what Amnesty International believes are un-sustained, 
politically motivated charges. 69 Furthermore, PPP members have been 
accused of being responsible for violent incidents in 1991, though there 
was no prima facie evidence to even link them with the events.70 Mass 
arrests of PPP members, Sindhi nationalist party members, and dissident 
members of the MQM also occurred during demonstrations.71  
 Repeated arrests, without foundation, have been used to keep such 
legislatures and opposition leaders from carrying out their political 
obligations and non-violent political activities.72 Furthermore, another 
form of political arrest has been short-term detentions of opposition party 
candidates, to prevent them from participating in elections and 
parliamentary votes.73 As an example of this phenomenon, is the case of 
Pir-Mazhar-ul-Haq, a lawyer who was elected to the Sindh provincial 
assembly by the PPP government in Sindh.74 
                                                 
68 Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 7-8. 
69 Id. at 8. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id at 9. 
73 Id. 
74 Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 9. 
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 Pir Mazhar was arrested on August 1990 on various un-related 
criminal charges including kidnapping for ransom and robbery.75 He was 
not given access to defense counsel or his family.76 The charges were 
finally dropped in September, after no evidence against him was found.77 
Despite the discharge order, he was not released; instead he was re-
arrested on three more unrelated criminal charges.78 For a week he was not 
brought before the magistrate, and yet his custody was remanded.79 His 
release was finally ordered in September, as the police were again not able 
to produce any evidence against him.80  
However, though the police report showed Pir Mazhar was 
released on September 14, again, he was not released.81 His wife filed a 
constitutional petition to the High Court of Sindh, alleging that her 
husband’s detention at the hands of the care-taker government was illegal, 
and solely an effort to deny him the freedom to campaign in the provincial 
elections.82 The Sindh High Court on October 2, 1990, declared that he 
should be released immediately.83 The State refused to release him.  
Though the public outside the jail cell were successful in demanding his 
release for a short time following a protest, he was re-arrested for the 
fourth time on October 23, 1990. He was again released on October 27 for 
lack of evidence.84 
                                                 
75 Id at 10. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 11. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
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 In June 1991, ten more charges were registered against Pir Mazhar 
and other MNAs.85 Five of the cases were dropped for lack of evidence.86 
Of the five remaining cases, the other accused citizens declared in sworn 
statements that they did not make any statements to implicate Pir Mazhar 
and the other MNA.87 Instead, they were forced to sign blank papers under 
torture, coercion and duress, which were later shown by the State to be the 
statements implicating Pir Mazhar.88 Pir Mazhar was compelled to move 
out of Sindh, since the warrants for the five pending cases continue to be 
out for his arrest.89 
 In January 1992, there was a crackdown on the leaders of the Jeay 
Sindh Mahaz (Long Live Sindh Front). Its leader, GM Syed, was placed 
under house arrest on January 18, for making a speech demanding a 
separate Sindhi homeland, though he had made such demands several 
times in the past.90 He was charged with a conspiracy to wage war against 
Pakistan, for condemnation of the creation of the state of Pakistan and for 
promoting enmity between different groups.91 In February of 1992, a 
Special Court for the Suppression of Terrorist Activities gave out arrest 
warrants for other Jeay Sindh Mahaz activists.92  
Throughout his life, G.M. Syed asserted that the Sindhi people 
hold an inalienable right to self-determination, and was known as a 
“visionary of the modern Sindhi nation.”93 He was committed to the idea 
that the independence of Sindh would help bring a lasting solution for 
                                                 
85 Id at 12. 
86 Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 12. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id at 18-19. 
91 Id. 
92 Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 19. 
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peace in Pakistan and the surrounding region.94 Though he was committed 
to peace, religious tolerance and non-violence, G.M Syed was repeatedly 
subjected to political detention without trials for over three decades.95 
Both Amnesty International and Human Rights International declared him 
a “Prisoner of Conscious.”96 He died in custody in 1995.97 
 More recently, under the military rule of General Musharraf, who 
took power in a bloodless coup in October of 1999, there continues to be 
suppression of peaceful political opposition. General Musharraf declared a 
Proclamation of Emergency as he seized power, allegedly to restore 
democracy to Pakistan.98 However, the proclamation remains in effect as 
of 2004, leaving open the possibility of limitless extensions of military 
rule. According to Pakistan’s Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights (a 
non-governmental organization), as of March 2004 there are 
approximately 170 political prisoners in Pakistani jails, most who have 
been held for months or years without proper trials.99 This includes the 
seven-year detention and documented torture of Benazir Bhutto’s 
husband, Asif Ali Zadari.100 Amnesty International reports that in the year 
2000, the military government of Pakistan sentenced 258 people to 
                                                                                                                         
93 Sindhi Link, Remembering G.M Syed (March, 1993) available at 
http://www.sindhilink.net/wsc/2003/g-m-syed-proceedings-2003 (last visited May 20, 
2004).  
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. See also, Human Rights International’s Press Release (1995), Violations of Human 
Rights in Sindh, including Death in Custody of Sain GM Syed, available at 
http://sindhlink.net/saeen/articles/articles_eulogy_wsc.htm. (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). 
97  Id. 
98 Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, Pakistan (2001), Pakistan, Human Rights 
Developments, available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/asia/pakistan.html 
99 South Asian Tribune, 170 Political Prisoners, (March, 2004), available at 
www.satribune.com/archives/feb29_mar6_04/PI_asif.htm. 
100 Id. The Economist, Benazir Bhutto’s Husband Freed (November 25, 2004), available 
at http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3436303. In November 2004, 
Asif Zardari was released from jail on a bail order after 8 years of imprisonment, as he 
had never been convicted of any of the 16 charges of corruption and murder against him. 
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death.101 Most of these prisoners were sentenced to death by the Special 
Courts, where many were presumed guilty of the charges against them.102 
Furthermore, human rights and women’s rights organizations throughout 
the country have been harassed through threats and intimidation.103 
4. New Anti-Terrorism Laws Affecting Political Opposition      
Members 
 
 In August 2000, under a promise to build a guided democracy, 
President Musharraf unilaterally amended the Pakistani Constitution.104 
Amendments to the Constitution gave President Musharraf the right to 
dissolve parliament and to extend his term in office. On January 26, 2001, 
President Musharraf also issued an order requiring all Supreme and High 
Court judges to uphold the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO), which 
prohibits the Supreme Court and High Courts from making any decisions 
against the Chief Executive.105 Holding the Legislature and Judiciary 
directly answerable to the military government has severely decreased 
political accountability in the country. 
 In what the president has called an effort to hold officials 
responsible for corruption, the creation of the National Accountability 
Bureau (NAB) has been used as a vehicle to suppress political opposition 
and detain former party leaders.106 Those convicted under the National 
Accountability Ordinance (NAO) are barred from political office for 21 
years.107 Under the NAO, the burden of proof for corruption charges is 
                                                 
101 Amnesty International, Report on Pakistan 2000, available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2000web.nsf 
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104 Macon News, Musharraf Grants Self Broad Powers (Aug 21, 2002), available at 
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placed on the defense.108 Political opposition has also been curbed through 
placing criminal charges against protest and rally organizers against the 
Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) Ordinance.109 This sedition law 
criminalizes speech that brings “hatred, or contempt, or excites or attempts 
to excite disaffection towards the Central or Provincial Government.”110 
Broad language in the ordinance also bans various forms of speech that “is 
likely to cause fear or alarm to the public” or is likely to “further any 
activity prejudicial to public safely or the maintenance of public order.”111 
Human Rights Watch has noted that the ethnically based Sindhi parties, 
Jeay Sindh Quami Mahaz (JSQM) and MQM, have been particularly 
targeted.112 
 In November of 2002, President Musharraf also tightened 
Pakistan’s anti-terrorism laws, a move that was criticized by various 
human rights groups.  The amendments in the Anti-Terrorism Act allow 
for the police to detain suspects for up to one year without bringing any 
charges.113 The previous term of detention was for a month. The 
amendments also allow Pakistani police to investigate the financial assets 
of relatives of any suspects, without showing reasonable suspicion for the 
search.114  
 The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) believes that 
these new amendments, which also enable police to arrest anyone 
suspected of having ties to groups that commit sectarian violence whether 
or not the group has been banned, are draconian.115 Opposition parties, 
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such as Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and human rights 
groups are calling this the “black law.”116 The PPP fears that such laws 
will enable the government to detain people who voice political 
opposition.117 The laws would allow Pakistani police and security to arrest 
people without any evidence against them, except for the faintest 
suspicion.118 
 Advocates of the anti-terrorism amendments allege that such laws 
were necessary, because under the previous laws, the police were unable 
to arrest forces that are hiding within Pakistan, but have committed no 
violence within Pakistan itself, such as Al-Qaeda. 119 
 Amnesty International recalls hundreds of people that have been 
arrested in Pakistan, detained or given over to US custody, by 
circumventing the existing legal safeguards.120 The current amendments 
are seen as unnecessary and arbitrary, given the fact that officials are 
circumventing the strict anti-terrorism laws that are already in place. 
121According to Amnesty International, “detaining anyone for up to a year 
on the mere suspicion that they may be associated with an organization 
which may not even be classified as an illegal group violates a whole 
range of internationally agreed human rights.” 122 Legalizing searches and 
detentions to take place without reasonable suspicion, can open the doors 
to unhindered police activity, violating Article 9 of the Universal 
                                                 
116 Nadeem Iqbbal, Musharraf Shows His Iron Fist (Nov. 20, 2002), Global Vision News 
Network, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DK21Df01.html.  
117 Id.  
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Amnesty International Press Release, Pakistan: No Need for More Laws To Fight 
Political Violence (Nov. 19, 2002), available at 
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Declaration of Human Rights, which calls for no one to be subject to 
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.123  
5. Political Arrests in Sindh are Violating Pakistan’s 
International Legal Obligations 
 
 Arbitrary arrest and detention without reference to any law at all 
violates International human rights standards.  Detention by repeated 
arrests and arbitrarily planting charges on persons is considered a form of 
“arbitrary detention,” violating Article 9(1) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 9(1) states, “Everybody has 
the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention.”124 Arbitrary detention also violates Article 9 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states, “No one shall 
be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”125 
 Political prisoners in Sindh are usually tried by courts set up under 
the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act of 1975.126 
This act allows the federal government and provincial government, at its 
direction, to set up special courts to try offenses found within the Act.127 
These offenses include non-violent political acts, such as sedition and 
attempting to wage war against Pakistan (which was the charge placed 
against G.M Syed after he demanded a separate Sindhi home-land).128 
This legislation includes provisions under Section 8, which deny the 
accused the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.129 The 
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accused can also be convicted on circumstantial evidence.130 The Special 
Courts Act clearly violates Article 14(2) of the ICCPR, which states that, 
“Everyone charged with a criminal offense shall have the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to the law.”131 This 
presumption of innocence is considered essential to protecting human 
rights. 
 Having a set of special courts whose procedures significantly differ 
from the regular courts “violates the right to be tried by the established 
legal procedures of one’s country.”132  Article 2 of the UN Basic 
Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary states that, “tribunals that 
do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be 
created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or 
judicial tribunals.”133  
 Furthermore, the fact that the trials of the Jeay Sindh Mahaz 
activists, under the Special Courts, were not open to the press or the public 
also violates a fundamental ICCPR principle stated in Article 14(1), that 
everyone shall be entitled to fair and public hearings, unless there are 
exceptional and well-defined circumstances for excluding the public.134  
 The documented torture, rape and killing of many political 
prisoners in detention violates Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which states, “No one shall be subjected to cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.”135 Human rights organizations 
urge Pakistan to ratify the UN Convention against Torture and Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the ICCPR.136  
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VI. The Kalabagh Dam Project:  The Most Recent Example of 
the Discrimination Against the Sindhi People 
 
1. Background 
 Pakistan is currently facing a huge water shortage due to a long 
cycle of drought and the reduced storage capacity of its existing two 
reservoirs.  President Musharraf is urging the building the Kalabagh Dam 
and reservoir and the Thal Canal to dam the Indus River and create more 
irrigation water.  The Kalabagh Dam will cost $42 billion and will 
generate 3,600 megawatts of electricity.137  President Musharraf urges that 
the dam is necessary to save 17 million-acre feet of water (MAF) a year 
from being wasted as this water currently flows to the sea.138  The 
Government argues that the Kalabagh reservoir would increase irrigation 
water supply reliability and compensate for the loss of water storage at the 
other dams, which is occurring due to silting. 139   
The Kalabagh Dam project was initially shelved due to huge 
opposition.  However, President Musharraf announced his intention to re-
start the project in September of 2003.  Sindhi political activists have been 
strongly protesting against the building of the Kalabagh Dam, and view its 
building as a matter of life and death.140 
 The government is concerned that with the rapidly growing 
population the demand for food and water will also increase. Pakistan’s 
increasing food import bill is being blamed on the rising population and 
                                                 
137 Ahmad Naeem Khan Pakistan’s Mega Dam Plan Hits Opposition Barrage (March 
2003), South Asia Monitor, available at 
http://southasia.oneworld.net/article/view/67237/1/.  
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the reduced availability of water.141 The provinces of Sindh and Punjab 
have been struggling for water rights, which has turned into a serious 
confrontation between the provinces regarding the distribution of the 
water of the Indus River.142 Though the Kalabagh Dam would generally 
create more irrigation water for the country, its most beneficial affects will 
be felt in the Punjab province, while the human and environmental costs 
will be mainly felt in Sindh. 
  In 2003, President Musharraf, while strongly urging the building 
of the Kalabagh Dam, also re-constituted the Indus River System 
Authority (IRSA) to resolve the dispute over the sharing of irrigation 
water.143 IRSA however, has not been able to work out an acceptable 
solution for the parties.144 
2. Why Sindh Opposes the Kalabagh Dam 
 There are various reasons why Sindh opposes the building of the 
Kalabagh Dam. The Kalabagh Dam will displace an estimated 124,000- 
250,000 people living mainly in Sindh, Baluchistan and the NWFP 
provinces.145 It will submerge at least 35,000 acres of land, including 
endangered mangrove forests.146 Several species of endangered fish, the 
famous Indus dolphin and sea cat would become extinct with the building 
of the dam and further shrink of the Indus Delta.147 Furthermore, ancient 
cities along the Indus, including Mardan, Charsadda and Nowshehra 
would sink.148 The resulting reduction of fresh water, following years of 
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drought in Sindh would be a disaster for Sindhi agriculture and 
fisheries.149 
 The PPP, MQM and various Sindhi nationalist parties feel the dam 
is designed to benefit Punjab, which is the most politically dominant and 
largest province, at the expense of Sindh, Baluchistan and the North West 
Frontier Province (NWFP). 150 Party leaders view the dam as an anti-Sindh 
plan. Nation wide anti-dam demonstrations and boycotts were staged in 
late 2003-2004, to appeal to the international donors against funding the 
dam.151 The Awami National Party general provincial secretary of NWFP 
expressed sentiments felt by the Sindhis when he said, “We are loyal to 
Pakistan. We want to live here, but [this project has] put us to the test.”152 
Sindh is not the only province opposed to the dam; notably, the Kalabagh 
Dam was rejected unanimously by the elected provincial parliaments of 
three of the four affected provinces in Pakistan.153 
 Sindhi political activists and environmental activists argue that in 
reality the Kalabagh Dam will be ineffective in meeting the Government’s 
expectations.  The dam will trap the sediments of the Indus, which has the 
fifth highest sediment load in the world, thereby increasing the salinity of 
the irrigation water available to Sindh.154 This would further degrade the 
agricultural productivity of the Indus basin and destroy the surrounding 
forests and fisheries.155  Ironically, the increased salinity is theorized to be 
the cause of the downfall of the early Indus Valley Civilization of Sindh 
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(of Mohenjo-Daro) 3,500 years ago.156  In addition, Sindh irrigation 
expert, Senator Kazi has emphasized to the government that there is not 
enough water in the Indus River flow to fill the dam. Because of low water 
flow in the Indus, any upstream reservoirs such as the Kalabagh will be 
unfilled an average of 5 out of every 6 years.157 
 The dam also represents a repetition of water violations, by what is 
seen as a “Punjab dominated” government. Punjab has been accused of 
illegally diverting water from the Tarbela Dam, which is also located on 
the Indus, by illegally keeping open link canals, in violation of past 
agreements.158 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the concession signed by 
Sindh, under the 1991 Water Accord, allowing water distribution to 
Punjab, was signed by the unelected care-taker government of Sindh, 
which was installed during the time when PM Nawaz Sharif 
simultaneously dissolved the PPP National Government and provincial 
assemblies.159 The care-taker government consisted of un-elected state 
leaders, installed by the central government.160  
For the Sindhis, the underlying fear is that the Kalabagh Dam may 
be used as a political instrument by the national government to further 
suppress Sindhi political freedoms, since the obvious consequences of 
damming the Indus, would leave Sindh economically weak and dependant 
on Punjab for food.161 
 In December of 2003, eleven US Congressmen from the House of 
Representatives wrote a letter to President Musharraf, urging that the 
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projects of the Kalabagh Dam and Thal Canal on the Indus River be 
halted.162 They stated, “The projects threaten the environmental security 
and the cultural and economic stability of the Sindh province. Already 
suffering from poverty and extreme drought, the Sindhi community would 
be greatly challenged if the river constructions continue.”163 They 
expressed their concern that the Pakistani government was ignoring the 
Sindhi’s opposition to the river constructions, which was made clear 
through the unanimous provincial government’s decision against the 
project and through the daily street protests occurring in Sindh.164  
 A majority of the populations living in the detrimentally affected 
provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan are already living under poverty 
levels. This is twice as high as the poverty rates in the other provinces.165 
The building of the dam, along with the government’s refusal to alleviate 
their conditions will lead to an economic imbalance within the country, 
threatening the unity and integrity of the nation.166 
3. Available Alternatives  
 In May of 2003, Pakistan made a request for funding future 
reservoirs including the Kalabagh Dam to international donor agencies 
and governments.167  The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
the Islamic Development Bank, the United Arab Emirates, Sweden and 
Japan all refused the request.168 First, the agencies stated there are 
alternatives available to Pakistan, as the country could, through proper 
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lining of its existing watercourses and canals, save 32 million acre feet 
(MAF) water, which is now being wasted in the saline zone because of the 
improper lining.169  Second, the Pakistani government could introduce a 
Water Pricing Mechanism (WPM) to encourage people to ration water.170  
And finally, donors stressed the importance of Pakistan developing a 
national water policy and consensus on controversial projects like the 
Kalabagh Dam; otherwise, its government would lack the political support 
and power necessary to initiate the project.171  
 In November of 2000, the World Commission on Dams (WCD), an 
independent and international organization, published a report stating, that 
though large dams have provided many benefits, it was often at too high of 
a price because the people affected have little say in their planning and 
building. It is usually the most marginalized people who are affected by 
the dam. In this case, it is the indigenous Sindhis who would feel the most 
adverse affects of the dam.  The WCD stated that there are many 
alternative means to meet the people’s energy needs including renewable 
energy, recycling, better irrigation and reduction of water losses. 
 If building more dams is considered necessary, another alternative 
is for the government to build dams which would be as effective, but 
which would carry a smaller human cost.  One proposal is the building of 
the Basha Dam that would produce 80% of Kalabagh’s power production 
and would also significantly reduce the silt volume that is flowing into the 
water reservoirs.172  However the government has not prepared the 
feasibility of other dam sites and sadly the people do not know of their 
options when it comes to choosing a site for building a dam.173 
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4. Strong Opposition to the Dam Demonstrated Throughout 
Sindh and Other Affected Provinces 
 
 Since the dam project was first announced, there have been almost 
daily protests in Sindh and other provinces against the dam.  For example, 
in 2000, strikes were held by the Sindh Peoples Students Federation 
(SPSF), resulting in the closing down of major cities in Sindh. 174 The 
Awami National Party (ANP) and the Sindhi Shaheed Bhutto Peoples 
Party, Sindh Students Federation, JSQM and MQM have joined the Anti-
Kalabagh Dam Action Committee to protest the project.175  The project 
has been described as one that is affecting the overall welfare of Sindh 
rather than an ethnic issue.176 The protestors have made clear, “You 
construct the Kalabagh dam, and we will build a Sindhu Desh 
(Nation).”177 
 More recently there have been hundreds of arrests of the peaceful 
protestors when the JSQM started peaceful sit-ins in March, 2004 against 
the Pakistani centralized decision to construct the dam.178  However, this 
action failed to deter protestors and the JSQM has continued to organize 
large protests and sit-ins across Sindh.  The World Sindhi Congress (a 
non-governmental human rights advocacy organization) has condemned 
the political harassment of the Sindhi people.179 Following what seems to 
have become standard practice, many protestors have been detained and 
held in unknown places.  Furthermore, they have been unable to meet with 
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family or defense counsel.180 Refusal to recognize the strong opposition to 
the dam is interpreted as a sign of the National Government’s 
discrimination against the Sindhi people and its lack of political 
accountability to the people. 
VII. Political Discrimination Against Sindhis, an Ethnic and 
Linguistic Minority Violates Pakistan’s International Legal 
Obligations 
 
 In present international law, discrimination is defined as “unfair, 
unreasonable, unjustifiable or arbitrary distinction applicable to any act or 
conduct which denies to individuals equality of treatment with other 
individuals because they belong to particular groups in society.”181 This 
principle protects individuals from group-based discrimination.  There are 
three basic groups recognized in international law: (1) ethnic and racial 
groups, (2) religious groups and (3) linguistic and cultural groups.182 As 
discussed earlier, Sindhis constitute a separate ethnic and linguistic group 
that distinguishes them from the Pakistani majority. These groups have the 
recognized right to existence and non-discrimination, under various 
international instruments.183  
 In 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which was signed by 
Pakistan. Under the Convention ‘racial discrimination’ is described 
broadly as: 
Any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based 
on race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin which 
has the purpose or effect of …impairing... exercise on an 
equal footing of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
                                                 
180 Id. 
181 LERNER, supra note 11, at 25. (quoting W. MCKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983)). 
182 LERNER, supra note 11, at 32. 
183 Id at 34-35. (These instruments include the Convention on Racial Discrimination, the 
ILO and UNESCO anti-discrimination treaties). 
Vol. 3 [2005]               SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW                           127  
   www.scu.edu/scjil 
 
 
 
 
the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of 
public life.184 
 
 Article 2 lists the obligations of the States.  States cannot practice 
racial discrimination against persons, groups or institutions, nor sponsor 
racial discrimination by any persons or groups.185 Government policies at 
the local and national level have to be reviewed to comply with the 
convention.186 Article 5 deals with the judicial, political and civil rights 
that should be guaranteed to the people.187  
 In the case of Sindh, it is clear that the Islamabad Government has 
failed to follow its obligations under the Convention.  First, as discussed 
earlier, the national government’s policy of political intimidation, mass 
arrests, and imprisonment of all political opponents and those specifically 
calling for more cultural autonomy violates Pakistan’s obligations under 
Art. 5(d).  Under Article 5(d), explicitly mentioned, are the rights to 
freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of opinion and expression, 
and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.188  Political 
rights are guaranteed under Article 5(c); individuals have the right to vote 
and stand for election.189  They have the right to take part in the 
government as well as the conducting of public affairs at all levels of 
government, and equal access to public services.190 Furthermore, placing 
the victims in continuous detention under inhumane conditions, through 
orders by the Pakistani Special Courts, violates Article 5(a), which states 
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that all individuals have the right to equal treatment under Court Tribunals 
and the Right to be secure by the State against violence.191  
 The government’s insistence to build the Thal Canal and Kalabagh 
Dam, despite the rejection of the proposal by three of the four provincial 
governments and its likely detrimental effects on the Sindhi people, is a 
sign of ethnic discrimination.  The national government’s insistence on the 
dam project violates Article 2 of the Convention as it has the purpose and 
effect of denying the Sindhi people equal footing of fundamental freedoms 
in their political, economic, social and cultural fields of life, since the dam 
will have devastating effects on both the economy and environment of the 
province.  
 Pakistan also signed the 1989 International Labor Organization 
(ILO) Convention, which calls for the protection of indigenous 
populations.  Under the Convention, “Indigenous peoples” are defined as 
those “on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited 
the country… at the establishment of present state boundaries, and who, 
irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, 
economic, cultural and political institutions.192 Sindhis are clearly 
regarded as such a people, as they have a long history of autonomy in 
following their own social, economic and cultural traditions.  
 The ILO passed the 1957 Indigenous and Tribal Populations 
Convention (No. 107), which was revised in 1989.  The Preamble of the 
Convention is aimed at protection of indigenous populations, improving 
their living and working conditions and achieving a progressive 
integration into their national communities.193  However, it should be 
noted that under Article 2(c), measures tending towards the artificial 
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assimilation of these populations” from national integration policies is 
excluded, as well as those measures using force or coercion as a means of 
promoting integration.194 
 Article 11 recognizes the right of indigenous members to 
ownership, collective or individual, of the land.195 Article 12, provides that 
indigenous populations cannot be removed from their habitual territories 
without their free consent, but exceptions are given for when removal is in 
accordance with the national law for reasons relating to national security 
or national economic development.196  
The Pakistani Government’s post-partition policy of allotting 
former Sindhi Hindu properties to political allies and to the new Muhajir 
refugees, without addressing the claims of Sindhi Muslims clearly violated 
this principle.  More recently, the Government’s insistence on the building 
of the Kalabagh Dam is a clear violation of Article 11, as the government 
fails to recognize the rights of the Indigenous Sindhi population to 
ownership of portions of the Indus River, or at least to have their concerns 
considered regarding the damming of the river.  Given the Indus River’s 
historical importance and current reliance by Sindhi agriculturalists and 
fishermen, and because damming of the river would also have a severe 
detrimental environmental impact on the Sindhi land, especially gives the 
Sindhi population basis to make the decision of whether or not the river 
should be dammed.  
 Although the Government may claim that building the dam, and 
displacing thousands of Sindhis is necessary for reasons of economic 
development under Article 12, there are strong arguments that the project 
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is not necessary or even favorable for the nation’s economic development.  
Building the dam would bring huge economic downfall for the Sindhi 
economy, as cities will be sunk, thousands will be displaced, and many 
more will lose their livelihood, detrimentally affecting the national 
economy.  Because there are clear energy alternatives available, this 
project cannot be said to be “necessary for reasons of economic 
development.”  Rather, the government should be more accommodating of 
Sindh’s concerns regarding decisions that detrimentally affect their land 
and environment.  To fail to recognize their concerns will only alienate an 
already frustrated populace further away from the vision of a unified 
Pakistan.  
Conclusion 
 Since the creation of the Pakistani State, there has been a denial of 
fundamental freedoms to the Sindhi People.  Sindhis have undergone 
staunch political repression under a highly centralized and unyielding 
government, including being denied the right to free speech and peaceful 
assembly.  Despite the fact that they enjoy a majority and indigenous 
status in Sindh, the minority Muhajir population has been politically and 
economically dominant.  Under a government policy of forced 
assimilation, Sindhis have been denied the right to promote their language 
and traditions and are now left with the reality that their 5,000 year-old 
culture is quickly vanishing.  The Kalabagh Dam controversy is just the 
most recent phenomenon of the National Government’s policy to 
discriminate against the Sindhi people.  
 The Government justifies its actions on a need to build national 
unity, however, these actions have been self-defeating.  Pakistan’s policy 
of forced cultural assimilation, political repression and lack of political 
accountability by the State, has pushed those populations living on the 
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brink of poverty and repression, such as the Sindhis, to become 
disillusioned with the Pakistani Government.  When a state denies even 
the most fundamental political rights and human rights, as recognized by 
international law, to groups within its population, it cannot but expect 
these groups to eventually grow frustrated and demand self-governance.  
Pakistan’s only hope at building national unity is to work quickly 
to restore its people’s confidence in the central government by accepting 
the reality that it is a diverse nation with ethnic and linguistic minorities 
existing within its borders. This includes recognizing that these indigenous 
populations have a right to fundamental freedoms, respect and dignity. 
